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Standoff explosives-detection technologies allow, in principle, for
the detection of pedestrian suicide bombers, although such sensors
are not yet sufficiently affordable and reliable to justify wide-
spread deployment. What if they were? Assuming the availability
of cheap, perfectly sensitive and specific suicide-bomber-sensing
devices, we analyze the operational effectiveness of sensor-based
detector schemes in reducing casualties from random suicide-
bombing attacks. We model the number of casualties resulting
from pedestrian suicide bombings absent intervention, the reduc-
tion in casualties from alternative interventions, given timely
detection of a suicide-bombing attack, and the probability of
timely detection under best-case assumptions governing the per-
formance of suicide-bomber-detector schemes in two different
urban settings. Even under such optimistic assumptions, we find
that the widespread deployment of suicide-bomber detectors will
not reliably result in meaningful casualty reductions. Relaxing the
best-case assumptions only makes matters worse. Investment in
intelligence-gathering to prevent suicide bombers before they
attack seems a wiser strategy than relying on sensor-based suicide-
bomber-detector schemes.
mathematical modeling  sensor detectors  suicide bombings
Suicide bombers (SBs) have murdered 500 Israeli civilianssince 2001 (1) (www.mfa.gov.ilmfaterrorism-%20obstacle
%20to%20peacepalestinian%20terror%20since%202000),
and hundreds of civilians and soldiers have been killed by SBs in
the current Iraqi insurgency (www.guardian.co.ukIraqpage0,
12438,1151021,00.html). Frequent suicide bombings in Israel
prompted the Jerusalem Post to complain that Israel’s weapons-
manufacturing industry had yet to develop a technological
solution including a ‘‘failure to invent an early detection device’’
(2). Citing similar concerns, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency recently commissioned the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academies to examine standoff
explosives detection, in part, to determine ‘‘the ability to detect
a suicide bomber before the bomber is able to reach his or her
target and detonate the explosive’’ (3).
As detailed in the NRC’s comprehensive report (3), sensors
employing x-ray or electromagnetic imaging in the infrared, terra-
hertz, millimeter, or microwave spectral range can, in principle,
detect SB explosive belts from standoff distances of at least 10 m,
and novel approaches based on explosive vapor-plume imaging,
anomalies in a SB’s local atmospheric-ion background, or distrib-
uted biological sensors have theoretical potential to contribute to
SB-detector systems. However, existing SB sensors are far from
perfectly sensitive or specific, and some of the more promising
sensors are bulky and expensive, for example, millimeter wave
detectors weigh 650 pounds and cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars per machine (3). Existing technologies are insufficiently
affordable and reliable for widespread deployment.
But what if they were affordable and reliable? Highly sensitive
and specific SB detectors deployed in portal screeningcheckpoint
environments at known targets (such as passenger screening at
airports or visitor screening at entrances to government buildings,
military installations, or sports events such as the SuperBowl) could
certainly prove useful. However, consider random, pedestrian
suicide-bombing attacks, that is, attacks by individual SBs on foot
at randomly chosen restaurants, shops, or other locations lacking
effective checkpoint security and otherwise distinguished only by a
crowd of potential victims.What is the operational potential of even
perfect SB-detector schemes to reduce casualties from attacks of
the sort experienced in Israel, Iraq, and elsewhere?
In the spirit of recent systems analyses modeling bioterror
attacks, preparedness, and response (4–6), we report an analysis
that models the number of casualties resulting from pedestrian
suicide bombings absent intervention, the reduction in casualties
from alternative interventions, given timely detection of a suicide-
bombing attack, and the probability of timely detection under
best-case assumptions governing the performance of SB-detector
schemes in two different urban settings. We focus on best-case
detection scenarios for the simple reason that, if such optimistic
analysis fails to demonstrate meaningful casualty reductions be-
cause of SB-detector schemes, then no analysis will (7).
Models
We consider pedestrian SB attacks in two urban environments. The
‘‘grid model’’ (Fig. 1A) presumes a layout of 200-m 200-m blocks
separated by 10 m of street and 4 m of sidewalk width. A SB arrives
at one of the intersections and walks at speed v along a blockface
containing k shops. Absent detection, the SB attacks the first shop
judged sufficiently attractive by entering and proceeding to its
center before detonating. The probability that any shop is consid-
ered sufficiently attractive equals q. The target areas inside shops
are modeled as circles with radius  m. Perfectly specific covert
sensors detecting with certainty any SB who passes within r m are
embedded in the center of a fraction f of the intersections in the
grid, and, if the SB is detected, there is sufficient time to execute an
intervention with the hope of reducing casualties (see Appendix).
The ‘‘plaza model’’ (Fig. 1B) portrays a large plaza or park (e.g.,
the Mall in Washington, DC, or New York’s Central Park).
Potential circular targets with radius  (e.g., crowd gatherings
around performances, speakers, or outdoor cafes) are distributed
within the plaza in accord with a spatial Poisson process. A SB
arrives at a random location in the plaza (e.g., by car, motorcycle,
or subway) and walks at speed v directly to the closest target located
Lmaway. Perfectly specific covert sensors capable of detectingwith
certainty a SB who passes within r m are deployed in nonoverlap-
ping fashion with density  m2. Unlike the grid model, detection
in the plaza model does not guarantee sufficient time to intervene,
but the probability of timely detection [meaning at least 10 sec
remain postdetection before the bomber explodes (3)] can be
computed as a function of , r, and the expected SB travel distance,
E(L) (see Appendix).
Individuals within a target area are modeled as cylinders with
height h  2h0 m and base width b m and are distributed over the
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target area in accord with a spatial Poisson process with density 
m2. Casualties from a SB explosion are modeled by determining
the expected number of individuals in the target area struck by at
least one of an expected n effective bomb fragments (screws, nails,
shrapnel, etc.) blasted in the beam spray centered at height h0 and
distributed uniformly over the angular dispersion (2,2) from
the horizontal and uniformly around the SB’s waist (see Appendix
and ref. 8). The ‘‘complete-blocking’’ assumption is used, meaning
that, if the line of sight between an individual and the bomber is
obscured by at least one other person, then the initial individual is
not harmed, because all effective fragments are absorbed by others
in the way (8–10). In the event of timely detection, reduced
casualties are estimated differentially, depending on the specific
intervention: SB neutralization prevents all casualties with proba-
bility . Instructing individuals to flee is modeled by reducing the
target population density to   , and ‘‘hit-the-deck,’’ where
individuals attempt to fall to the ground preexplosion, is modeled
by reducing individual heights to h  h (see Appendix). The
best-case operational effectiveness of any SB-detector-scheme
intervention-policy pair is modeled as the product of the expected
reduction in casualties, given timely detection, and the probability
of timely detection.
Parameter Values
Shown in Table 1 are our base-case parameter values. The target-
area radius  10 m reflects the ‘‘zone of severe damage,’’ and the
sensor detection radius r  10 m corresponds to the standoff
detection distance necessary for pedestrian SBs, as determined by
the NRC panel (3). The SB walking speed of v  1 msec1 also
stems from ref. 3. Individual height h  2h0 was set at 1.75 m, the
average male height (www.cdc.govnchsfastatsbodymeas.htm),
and base width b was taken as 0.5 m, implying a height-to-width
ratio of 3.5 (8). Our base hit-the-deck height h  0.5 m reflects
people falling on their sides, although we consider all h  h 
1.75 m in sensitivity analyses. The target-area population density 
was set to 1 m2 to yield a base-case target-area population of
100, although we vary  from 0 to 2.5 in our analyses. The
beam-spray-dispersion angle   10° and expected number of
effective bomb fragments n  100 are from ref. 8 (although we
allow n3  to model very large explosions). We set k  10 shops
per blockface in the grid model and set the baseline probability that
any shop encountered by a SB is targeted to q  13, which yields
a base-casemean travel distance of 60m (seeAppendix) and, hence,
amean travel time of 60 sec for undetected SBs, given the presumed
  1 msec1 walking speed. We set the base-case mean travel
distance E(L)  60 m in the plaza model as well to maintain
consistency but vary the distance from 0 to 240 m in sensitivity
analyses. The fraction of intersections covered by sensors in the grid
model was set optimistically to f 1 in the base case, meaning that
sensors are placed in every intersection. Obtaining the same sensor-
Fig. 1. Model topologies assumed in the analysis. (A) The grid model
presumes a SB arrives at a random intersection in a grid of 200 200-m blocks
separated by 10 m of street and 4 m of sidewalk, with k  10 shops per
blockface, and perfect SB sensors deployed in a fraction f of the intersections.
The SB will be detected upon entering any intersection containing a sensor. (B)
The plaza model presumes a SB arrives at a random point in a plaza where
sensors deployed with spatial density  m2 perfectly detect SBs within a
detection radius of r 10 m. The SB travels distance L to the nearest target and
will be detected if a sensor is deployed within either the arrival detection zone
of area r2 or the en route detection zone of area 2rL.
Table 1. Base-case parameter values
Parameter Description Value Reference
 Target-area radius 10 m 3
 Target-area population density 1 persons m2 See text
b Individual base width 0.5 m 8, see text
h Individual height 1.75 m See text
h0 Suicide-bomb belt height h2  0.875 m See text
h Post-hit-the-deck height 0.5 m See text
n Expected harmful bomb fragments 100 8
 Beam spray dispersion angle 10° 8
k Number of shops per blockface 10 See text
q Shop attractiveness probability 13 See text
 Suicide bomber walking speed 1 msec1 3
r Sensor-detection radius 10 m 3
f Sensor-deployment fraction 1 See text
E(L) Mean suicide bomber travel distance 60 m See text
 Spatial sensor density in plaza model 6.6  104 sensorsm2 See text
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deployment fraction in the plaza model requires setting the sensor
density   f(r2  2rE(L))  6.6  104 m2, when f  1 (see
Appendix).
Casualties Absent and Present Timely Detection
An expected 28.5 individuals would be struck by bomb fragments
in our base case. In Israel, 471 civilians were killed and another
3,390 wounded in 85 suicide bombings between 2001 and 2003,
averaging 5.5 deaths and 40 injuries per bomb (1) (www.mfa.gov.
ilmfaterrorism-%20obstacle%20to%20peacepalestinian%20
terror%20since%202000), thus, expected casualties in our base
case correspond to the sum of deaths plus 60% of those injured in
the average Israeli attack. This strikes us as reasonable because,
although bomb fragments are themain cause of casualties in suicide
bombings, injuries also result from broken glass or falling debris.
Letting the expected number of bomb fragments n3  increases
expected casualties to 37.3 per bomb.
Fig. 2A reports expected casualties for n  100 and n3  as a
function of the population density in the target area . This figure
highlights the tradeoff between crowd size and crowd blocking (8):
As  increases from 0, casualties initially increase because there are
more individuals to harm. However, beyond a critical density *	
0.4 (corresponding to a target population of	125), the number of
casualties decreases because of crowd blocking; even though there
are more people to be harmed, the probability of being exposed to
a bomb fragment declines exponentially in . Fig. 2A suggests that,
given timely detection, preventing a suicide bombing could save
between 10 and 35 casualties under a wide range of target-
population densities and bomb sizes, but successful prevention is
not guaranteed, even if a SB is detected with time to act. If an
attempt to neutralize a SB stands only a 50% chance of success,
then, obviously, the expected reduction in casualties would fall
between 5 and 18. Fig. 2A also shows that attempts to flee a target
area upon learning that a SB is about to explode could actually
increase casualties if the effective population density in the target
area is reduced from  to , but  exceeds the critical density *,
for example. Another policy that has been proposed is to instruct
individuals in a target area to ‘‘hit the deck’’ (fall to the ground)
upon learning that a SB is about to explode, under the assumption
that minimizing an individual’s exposed surface area will minimize
the chance of being struck by a bomb fragment (8). Fig. 2B reports
casualties under this intervention for various postintervention
heights h  h and different bomb sizes, with other parameters set
at their base-case values. If individuals are able to fall from h 
1.75 m to h  0.5 m, expected casualties would be reduced from
28.5 to 8.8, whenn 100 bomb fragments, an almost 70%reduction
in expected casualties. For bombs with 100 or 150 effective frag-
ments, expected casualties are reduced for any h  1.75 m. For
larger bombs, however, Fig. 2B reveals that hit-the-deck also
presents a tradeoff between crowd blocking and the likelihood of
being hit by a bomb fragment, and, depending on the number of
bomb fragments in the explosion, hit-the-deck can increase rather
than decrease casualties. For example, in a bomb with 10,000
effective fragments, falling from 1.75 m to 0.5 m would actually
increase casualties from 37.3 to 50. Only if individuals truly mini-
mize their exposed surface areas by falling to heights of, at most,
0.2 m, would hit-the-deck significantly reduce casualties.
Timely Detection Probabilities and Minimum
Sensor Deployment
Fig. 3A shows the probability of detecting a SB with at least 10 sec
remaining postdetection before explosion. Timely detection is
ensured in the gridmodel if sensors are located in every intersection
( f 1). Given the grid topology assumed, the probability of timely
detection is always at least as large as the sensor-deployment
fraction f. Increases in the timely detection probability with the
mean SB time to explosion are initially modest but become more
pronounced with longer delay; for example, if f  0.5, the proba-
bility of timely detection equals 0.5 if the mean time to explosion
equals 60 sec and increases to only 0.54 if the mean time to
Fig. 2. Expected casualties in a SB attack. Shown are expected casualties vs.
the population density in the target area for bombs with an expected 100
(black) or infinite (red) harmful bomb fragments (A) and post-hit-the-deck
individual heights for bombs with 100 (black), 150 (green), 500 (turquoise),
1,000 (purple), and 10,000 (red) expected harmful fragments (B).
Fig. 3. The performance of perfect SB detector schemes. (A) Probability p of
detecting a SB with at least 10 sec remaining before explosion as a function of
the mean time from SB arrival to explosion in the grid (dashed curves) and
plaza (solid curves) models for sensor deployment fractions f0.5 (black), 0.75
(turquoise), and 1.0 (red). (B) The sensor deployment fraction f() required for
timely detection in the grid (dashed curves) and plaza (solid curves) models
with probabilities   0.6 (black), 0.7 (turquoise), and 0.8 (red) vs. the mean
time from SB arrival to explosion.










explosion equals 120 sec but grows to 0.63 as the mean time to
explosion reaches 240 sec. Timely detection in the plaza model is
more difficult. Although the timely detection probability grows
quickly as the mean SB time to explosion approaches 20 sec, this
probability quickly flattens for larger SB travel times and asymp-
totes to the sensor-deployment fraction f, which, in the plazamodel,
is the fraction of the plaza in which a SB would be detected for a
given sensor density (see Appendix). If f  1 (meaning sensors can
detect SBs anywhere in the plaza), the timely detection probability
equals 76% when the mean SB travel time equals 30 sec, 86% at 60
sec, 93% at 120 sec, and asymptotes to 100%. Note that, for any
fixed set of parameter values, the probability of timely detection is
always higher in the grid model than in the plaza model. Fig. 3B
shows a plot of the sensor-deployment fractions required in the grid
and plaza models to achieve desired timely detection probabilities.
For example, to ensure that 80% of SBs are detected with at least
10 sec remaining until explosion, when SBs average 60 sec between
arrival and explosion, requires deploying sensors in 79.7% of the
intersections in the grid model. The requisite sensor-deployment
fraction in the plaza model for the same scenario is 92.6%, which
translates to a physical sensor density of 6  104 m2. In a 500 
500-m plaza, this would equate to deploying 150 sensors.
Expected Casualty Reductions
The expected reduction in casualties that can be anticipated from
best-case SB-detector schemes can be found by combining the
results of the previous two sections for any scenario desired. For
example, employing our base-case parameters in the gridmodel and
assuming hit-the-deck intervention, timely detection is assured, and
the expected reduction in casualties equals 19.7. The same scenario
in the plaza model results in preventing an expected 16.9 casualties
per attack. With f  0.5, the expected number of casualties
prevented would fall to 9.9 and 8.5 in the grid and plaza models,
respectively. If a bomb contains, essentially, an infinite number of
fragments, but, by fleeing the target area, the population density is
reduced from 1 to 0.51 (so the expected target population is
halved from 100 to 50), then, in the base case, the overall expected
numbers of casualties averted equal 7.3 and 6.3 in the grid and plaza
models, respectively. Reducing f from 1 to 0.5 would result in
preventing only 3.7 and 3.2 casualties, respectively.
Discussion
Although existing and potential technologies for standoff explo-
sives detection promise the feasibility of SB-detector schemes, even
perfect detection does not necessarily translate to substantial
reductions in expected casualties from random pedestrian SB
attacks. To detect upwards of 80% of all attacks in a timely fashion
with perfect sensors requires deployment fractions of 70–80%,
depending on the relevant urban topology (grid vs. plaza, Fig. 3B),
whereas to translate detection into a meaningful reduction in
casualties requires quick implementation of interventions that,
although reducing harm in certain situations, could actually lead to
more casualties in others (Fig. 2).
We have arrived at these conclusions having made several
best-case assumptions, including (i) perfect sensor specificity (i.e.,
no costly false-positive errors), (ii) perfect sensor sensitivity within
the detection radius r, (iii) covert sensor placement, (iv) SB detec-
tion is always timely within the grid model, and (v) nonoverlapping
sensor placement to maximize detection in the plaza model. Re-
laxing any of these assumptions can only lower the operational
effectiveness of SB-detector schemes in reducing attack casualties.
Some might argue that the deployment of SB sensors has value,
provided that such devices are perceived as effective: Terrorists
might be deterred from attempting suicide bombings if they believe
they will be interdicted, and the public might be reassured that they
are being protected. However, SBs have demonstrated, on numer-
ous occasions, their willingness to attack overtly defended targets.
Both this fact and the frequency of random pedestrian suicide
bombings that are the subject of this article make the deterrence
argument difficult to accept. England’s experiment with widely
deployed visible cameras in public places to deter crime and
reassure citizens failed on both counts (www.homeoffice.gov.uk
rdspdfs05hors292.pdf). Moreover, the occurrence of suicide
bombings against a backdrop of promised sensor-based detection
and protection could rapidly transform an assured public into one
of deep distrust.
Rather than focusing on technology that enables detecting SBs
and last-second intervention, consider Israel’s intelligence-driven
approach to controlling SBs, where the great majority of planned
SB attacks has been preempted by arresting would-be bombers or
destroying bomb-making laboratories before an attack can be
launched (1) (www1.idf.ilSIPSTORAGEDOVERfiles6
31646.doc). Pedestrian suicide bombings might be better prevented
by investing in intelligence leading to actions that prevent terrorists
from prosecuting such attacks.
Conclusion
We have presented the formulation and results of a suite of models
that, to our knowledge, is the first designed specifically to evaluate
the operational effectiveness of SB-detector schemes in urban
settings. Our modeling approach could also be applied to interdic-
tion scenarios, such as the hot pursuit of terror suspects, perimeter
security, or the protection of highly valuable targets (e.g., the
president). Under best-case assumptions favoring the probability of
timely detection over a wide range of scenarios, our results suggest
strongly that even the widespread deployment of such sensors
would not reliably reduce expected casualties. Although we believe
that SB sensors could play a very important role in the defense of
known targets, we believe our results show decisively that deploying
SB-detector schemes is not likely to prove effective in protecting
civilian populations from random pedestrian SB attacks.
Appendix
Casualties in an Undetected Suicide-Bombing Attack. A SB reaches
the center of a circular target area with radius . Individuals are
distributed over the target area in accord with a spatial Poisson
process with a density of  persons per unit area, resulting in an
expected 2x
x targeted individuals between distances x and x

x from the explosion and an expected total target population of
2 at the time of attack.
All targeted individuals are modeled as cylinders of height h 
2h0 and base width b, and the SB wears an explosive belt around his
waist centered at height h0. We make the complete-blocking
assumption (8–10) that, if the line of sight between the center of a
targeted individual at distance x and the center of the bomber is
obscured by at least one other person, then the individual at
distance x is not harmed (because all effective fragments that could
potentially injure the person at distance x are absorbed by others in
the way). Clearly, less-than-complete blocking would result in more
casualties (8). From the spatial Poisson assumption, the probability
that there are no individuals centered within a corridor of width b
and distance x from the bomber is equal to exp(bx); this is the
probability that an individual at distance x from the SB is exposed
to the explosion.
The explosion releases an expected n effective (i.e., harmful)
fragments that fly in a beam spray uniformly around the bomber
and uniformly over the angular dispersion (2,2), as mea-
sured from the horizontal at height h0. As detailed in ref. 8, the
resulting density 	(x) of effective bomb fragments per unit area in
the beam spray at distance x from the explosion equals n(4x2sin
(2)), because the potential surface area within which effective
fragments can fly at distance x equals 4x2sin (2). The exposed
(to bomb fragments) height h(x) of a targeted individual at distance
x from the explosion is equal to 2xtan (2), providing x 
 h0tan
(2), because the beam spray from an explosion at height h0 with
angular dispersion between 2 and 2 can cover only heights
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between h0  xtan (2) and h0  xtan (2); otherwise h(x) h.
The expected number of fragments capable of striking a targeted
individual at distance x from the explosion thus equals 	(x)bh(x).
We assume that the distribution of the number of fragments over
any fixed area of exposure also follows a spatial Poisson process (as
is consistent with the uniformity assumptions governing the dis-
persal of bomb fragments), thus, the probability that an individual
at the end of an unobstructed corridor of width b and distance x
from the explosion would be hit (and harmed) by at least one
effective fragment is equal to 1  exp(	(x)bh(x)).
The expected number of casualties among those located at
distance x from the explosion is, thus, the product of three terms:
the expected number of persons located at distance x from the
explosion, the probability a person at distance x is exposed to the
explosion, and the conditional probability of being hit by a bomb
fragment, given exposure. Integrating over all possible distances
within the target area yields the expected number of casualties from




2x eb,x 1 e	xbhxdx. [1]
Note that, as the number of effective fragmentsn3, the fragment







1 1 beb. [2]
Eqs. 1 and 2 were used to produce Fig. 2A.
Reduced Casualties Because of Timely Interventions. Given timely
detection [meaning at least a 10-sec warning before the bomber
explodes (3)], interventions that either prevent an explosion with
probability  or fail to have any effect will save an expected 
c 
c casualties; attempted bomber neutralization is one such inter-
vention with  being the probability of successful neutralization.
We model the situation where individuals in the target area are
instructed to flee as equivalent to reducing the population density
from  to   , which enables the use of Eqs. 1 and 2 to evaluate
the change in expected casualties. Note that, because of the loss of
crowd-blocking associated with reducing the population density in
the target area, it is possible that ‘‘successful’’ implementation of
this policy could, in fact, cause casualties to increase (Fig. 2A).
Wealso consider hit-the-deck interventions, whereby those in the
target area reduce their heights from h to h  h by attempting to
fall to the ground, and we optimistically assume they maintain their
base width b. Assuming that the bomb still explodes at height h0, as
before, first consider the situation if targeted individuals reduce
their heights to h 
 h0. In this case, by using straightforward
geometrical arguments similar to those in ref. 8, it is easy to deduce
that no person located at distance x (h0 h)tan(2) would be
injured in the explosion because such persons would fall completely
beneath the beam spray of harmful fragments. Persons at the end
of an unobstructed corridor of width b and distance x  ((h0 
h)tan (2), h0tan(2)) from the explosion would have h(x)
h  (h0  xtan (2)) of their height exposed to harmful
fragments, whereas those at the end of an unobstructed corridor at
distance x  h0tan(2) would have their full postintervention
height exposed [i.e., h(x)  h]. Again, optimistically assuming
complete blocking, an individual at distance x (h0 h)tan(2)
from the explosion would be exposed to harmful fragments only if
nobody is in the corridor of width b from distance (h0  h)
tan(2) to x [any person closer than distance (h0  h)tan(2)
falls beneath the beam spray and cannot contribute to crowd-
blocking]; thus, the exposure probability for an individual at such a
distance equals exp(b(x (h0 h)tan(2))). Collecting these
results (and following the logic used to derive Eq. 1), we obtain the






 1  e	xbhxdx . [3]
The expected number of casualties prevented is then given by 
c 
c  c for this case. A similar set of arguments applies to the case
where the postintervention height h falls between h0 and 2h0. Eq.
3 for h
 h0 (and its equivalent for h0 h
 2h0) was used in Fig.
2B. Note that, depending on the number of effective fragments in
the explosion, hit-the-deck could increase rather than decrease the
number of casualties. As was the case with reducing the population
density in the target area, this possibility derives from reduced
crowd-blocking.
Probability of Timely Detection: Grid Model.Wepresume a grid (Fig.
1A) of 200 200-m blocks separated by 10 m of street and 4 m of
sidewalk width. Each blockface contains k  10 shops with en-
trances centered along their 20-m storefronts. A SB is dropped off
at a randomly selected intersection within the grid and begins
walking along one of the blockfaces. Note that the first shop
entrance is located 10 m from the SB’s dropoff point. Absent
detection, the SB decides to attack the first shop where there are a
sufficient number of individuals inside. The probability that the SB
judges any given shop to be target-worthy equals q. Letting S index
the shop targeted by the SB along his travel path, the probability
that S  s (i.e., that the SB will target the sth shop encountered)
equals q(1  q)s1. Note that the expected index of the targeted
shop is given by E(S)  1q. The target area inside each shop is
modeled in a circular fashion with radius   10 m; thus, the SB
must walk an additional 10m from the entrance to the center of the
target area in the targeted shop. The total trip length L that an
undetected SB travels before exploding is, thus, given by
L 10
Ç
Distance to 1st shop






 20S , [4]
which yields an expected trip length from arrival to explosion of
E(L)  20q.
The number of individuals within a targeted shop is assumed to
be distributed in accord with a spatial Poisson process with density
 per unit area, thus an undetected SB explosion results in c
casualties, as derived in Eqs. 1 and 2. However, covert sensor-based
detectors capable of perfectly sensing the SB within r  10 m (the
required effective standoff distance for detecting pedestrian SBs)
(3) are randomly located in the center of a fraction f of the
intersections in the grid. Thus, if the SB is dropped off or passes
through an intersection where such a detector is deployed, he will
be detected with certainty, clearly a best-case assumption. Also,
because experts have judged that 10 sec are required preexplosion
to intervene in a suicide bombing and the typical walking speed v
1 msec (3), our assumptions further imply that any SB detected
before exploding is detected in sufficient time to intervene because,
from Eq. 4, the total travel distance L  20 m, which yields a
warning of at least 20 sec, given detection (another best-case
assumption).We also assume that the sensor detectors are perfectly
specific, meaning that there are no false-positive SB alarms, a
further best-case assumption.
Under these assumptions, the probability that a SB is detected
before explosion can be reduced to the conditional probability
that a bomber is detected at the beginning of a particular
blockface, given that the bomber either is detected or explodes










on this same blockface. The probability of detection upon
entering a blockface is simply given by f, whereas the probability
that the SB explodes in a shop on a given blockface is equal to
(1  f )  (1  (1  q)k), which is the probability of not being
detected and selecting one of the k shops on the blockface as a
target. Thus, the probability of timely detection before explosion
in the grid model, pgrid, is given by
pgrid
f
f  1  f 1  1  qk
. [5]
Eq. 5 was used in Fig. 3A.
Probability of Timely Detection: Plaza Model. We presume a large
plaza or park with the centers of potential targets distributed in
accord with a spatial Poisson process, with target density  per unit
area, where, again, we model targets as circular areas with radius 
and population density . A SB arrives at a random point in the
plaza and proceeds directly toward the closest target. Given that
targets are spatially Poisson-distributed, the trip length L to the
closest target follows the Rayleigh distribution given by
PrL    e


4 EL 2 for   0, [6]
where the mean trip length E(L)  1(2) (11). Expected
casualties because of an undetected SB are, again, estimated
according to Eqs. 1 and 2. Perfectly specific covert sensor detectors
are distributed throughout the plaza. As in the grid model, each
sensor can perfectly detect any SB who passes within the r  10 m
detection radius. A SB will be detected upon arrival if a sensor is
located within the arrival detection zone with area r2 centered
about the point of arrival (Fig. 1B). Barring detection upon arrival,
a SB who travels distance L to the nearest target will be detected
if a sensor is located within the en route detection zone of area 2rL
centered along the direct path from the arrival point to the center
of the target area (Fig. 1B). Nonoverlapping sensor deployment is
assumed, whichmeans that, at most, one sensor can be found in the
union of the arrival and en route detection zones for any travel path;
this is a best-case assumption because it maximizes the detection
probability. Specifically, if there are m sensors distributed over the
plaza of area a, resulting in a sensor density of ma sensors per
unit area, we assume that the probability a SB is detected upon
arrival equalsmr2ar2 and the probability a SB is detected
en route equals m 2rE(L)a  2rE(L). To ensure physical
plausibility, the total detection zone accounting for all sensors,m






To maintain scale comparability to the grid model, we define the
sensor-deployment fraction f   (r2  2rE(L)). The sensor-
deployment fraction varies between 0 and 1 and reports the fraction
of maximal coverage achieved for a given sensor deployment in the
plaza model, just as f denotes the fraction of intersections covered
in the grid model.
Unlike the grid model, however, detection in the plaza model
does not guarantee sufficient time for intervention. Again, assum-
ing that 10 sec are required to execute an intervention and that the
SB walks at v  1 msec (3), the conditional probability of timely
detection, given detection upon arrival, is given by
Pr{timely detectiondetection on arrival}




from Eq. 6. If the SB is detected en route, nonoverlapping sensor
deployment implies detection at a random location along his travel
path. This means that the probability density of the remaining
distance to the target will follow the well known residual life density
of renewal theory given by Pr{L  }E(L) (12), and the proba-
bility that the SB will travel at least 10 sec postdetection before
exploding equals









d  2  52EL  , [9]
where  () is the tail probability associated with the standard
normal distribution. Combining our results, the unconditional
probability of timely detection pplaza, which is the probability that at





EL2 2rEL  2  52EL  .
[10]
Eq. 10 was used in Fig. 3A.
Minimum Sensor Deployment. Let pi denote the probability of
timely detection in scenario i  grid, plaza. The sensor-
deployment fraction fi() required for timely detection with
probability  in scenario imust force pi . For the grid model,
this implies, according to Eq. 5, that the fraction of intersections
covered by sensors is equal to at least
fgrid 
  1  qk
1  1  qk
. [11]
For the plaza model, the corresponding minimal sensor-
deployment fraction is equal to





EL2 2rEL  2  52EL  ,
[12]
as follows from Eq. 10, and the definition of the sensor-
deployment fraction follows Eq. 7. Eqs. 11 and 12 were used to
produce Fig. 3B.
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